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Abstract
We use data on households￿ deductible choices in auto and home insurance to
estimate a structural model of risky choice that incorporates "standard" risk aversion
(concave utility over ￿nal wealth), loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting.
Our estimates indicate that nonlinear probability weighting plays the most important
role in explaining the data. More speci￿cally, we ￿nd that standard risk aversion is
small, loss aversion is nonexistent, and nonlinear probability weighting is large. When
we estimate restricted models, we ￿nd that nonlinear probability weighting alone can
better explain the data than standard risk aversion alone, loss aversion alone, and
standard risk aversion and loss aversion combined. Our main ￿ndings are robust to a
variety of modeling assumptions.
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Households are averse to risk￿ for example, they require a premium to invest in equity and
they purchase insurance at actuarially unfair rates. The standard expected utility model
attributes risk aversion to a concave utility function de￿ned over ￿nal wealth states (di-
minishing marginal utility for wealth). Research in behavioral economics, however, suggests
that the standard account is inadequate. The leading alternative account, o⁄ered by prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), posits that two addi-
tional features of risk preferences￿ loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting￿ play
important roles in explaining aversion to risk.
In this paper, we use data on households￿deductible choices in auto and home insurance
to estimate a structural model of risky choice that incorporates "standard" risk aversion
(concave utility over ￿nal wealth), loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting. Our
estimates indicate that nonlinear probability weighting plays the most important role in
explaining the data. More speci￿cally, we ￿nd that standard risk aversion is statistically
signi￿cant but economically small, loss aversion is nonexistent, and nonlinear probability
weighting is statistically and economically signi￿cant. When we estimate restricted models,
we ￿nd that nonlinear probability weighting alone can better explain the data than standard
risk aversion alone, loss aversion alone, and standard risk aversion and loss aversion combined.
Section 2 provides an overview of our data. The source of the data is a large U.S.
property and casualty insurance company that o⁄ers multiple lines of insurance, including
auto and home coverage. The full data set comprises yearly information on more than 400,000
households who held auto or home policies between 1998 and 2006. For each household,
the data contain, inter alia, the household￿ s deductible choices for three property damage
coverages￿ auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. The data also include the
household-coverage-speci￿c menus of premium-deductible combinations that were available
to each household when it made its deductible choices. In addition, the data contain each
household￿ s claims history for each coverage, as well as a rich set of demographic information.
We utilize the data on claim realizations and demographics to assign to each household a
household-coverage-speci￿c predicted claim rate for each coverage.
Section 3 describes our theoretical framework. We ￿rst develop an underlying microeco-
nomic model of deductible choice that incorporates standard risk aversion and loss aversion
by adopting a variant of the model of reference-dependent preferences proposed by K‰ oszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007). We then generalize the K‰ oszegi-Rabin model to allow for rank-
dependent nonlinear probability weighting (Quiggin 1982), and we use the one-parameter
probability weighting function proposed by Prelec (1998). In specifying our econometric
1model, we follow McFadden (1974, 1981) and assume random utility with additively sep-
arable choice noise. In addition, we permit each of the utility parameters to depend on
observable household characteristics.
Section 4 presents the main estimation results. They suggest that nonlinear probability
weighting plays the key role in explaining the households￿deductible choices. Under our
benchmark speci￿cation, the mean and median estimates of the coe¢ cient of absolute risk
aversion are 3:0 ￿ 10￿5 and 1:0 ￿ 10￿7, respectively; the mean and median estimates of the
coe¢ cient of loss aversion are both zero; and the mean and median estimates of the nonlinear
probability weighting parameter (Prelec￿ s ￿) are both 0:7 (standard linear weighting involves
￿ = 1). Qualitatively, our results imply a small role for standard risk aversion, little to no
role for loss aversion, and a large role for nonlinear probability weighting. For example, we
show that our benchmark estimates imply that standard risk aversion generates a negligible
increase in willingness to pay for lower deductibles (relative to the actuarially fair premium),
whereas nonlinear probability weighting generates a substantial increase.
Section 5 contains a sensitivity analysis. Most importantly, we consider other probability
weighting functions, including the one-parameter function proposed by Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992). All in all, we ￿nd that our benchmark estimates are quite robust to alternative
model speci￿cations. We conclude the paper with a brief discussion in Section 6.
Numerous previous studies structurally estimate risk preferences from observed choices,
relying in most cases on nonmarket data (survey and experimental data) and in some cases
on market data, including insurance data. The majority of the studies in the literature
estimate models that incorporate only standard risk aversion.1 A minority, however, allow
for loss aversion or nonlinear probability weighting, or both.2 Cicchetti and Dubin (1994), for
instance, take an approach similar to ours, though they reach somewhat di⁄erent conclusions.
They use data on telephone customers￿interior wire insurance choices to estimate a random
utility model that allows for nonlinear probability weighting. While they ￿nd that the
average customer has a relatively small degree of absolute risk aversion,3 they ￿nd only
slight evidence that consumers weight line trouble probabilities nonlinearly. One limitation
of their study, however, is that the interior telephone wire insurance market is characterized
by extremely low, and tightly dispersed, stakes and claim probabilities.4 More recently, three
1Two that use data on deductible choices are Cohen and Einav (2007) and Sydnor (forthcoming). The
latter discusses, but does not estimate, the K‰ oszegi-Rabin model.
2In addition to the studies discussed below, see, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Hey and Orme
(1994), Jullien and SalaniØ (2000), Choi et al. (2007), Post et al. (2008), and Tanaka et al. (2010).
3We should note, however, that this result is a matter of dispute (Rabin and Thaler 2001; Grgeta 2003).
4The average consumer in their sample faces a price of $0.45 per month to insure against a 0.5 percent
chance of incurring a loss of $55. The authors do not report the dispersion in stakes, but they do report
that claim rates vary only from 0.3 percent to 0.7 percent.
2studies report ￿ndings comparable to ours, though each takes a di⁄erent approach. Bruhin
et al. (forthcoming) use experimental data on subjects￿choices over binary money lotteries
to estimate a mixture model of cumulative prospect theory. They ￿nd that approximately
20 percent of subjects can essentially be characterized as expected value maximizers, while
approximately 80 percent of subject exhibit signi￿cant nonlinear probability weighting (and
small to moderate money nonlinearity). Snowberg and Wolfers (forthcoming) use data on
gamblers￿bets on horse races to test the ￿t of two models￿ a model with standard risk
aversion alone and a model with nonlinear probability weighting alone￿ and ￿nd that the
latter model better ￿ts their data. Kliger and Levy (2009) use data on call options on the
S&P 500 index to estimate a cumulative prospect theory model. Like us, they ￿nd that
standard risk aversion is small and that nonlinear probability weighting is large, but, unlike
us, they ￿nd evidence of loss aversion. A limitation of the latter two studies, however, is
that they have only aggregate data, which necessitates that they take a representative agent
approach and rely on equilibrium "ratio" conditions to identify the agent￿ s utility function.
Our paper complements these studies and contributes to the literature principally by utilizing
disaggregated, market data in a setting of central interest to economists.
2 Data Description
2.1 Overview and Core Sample
We acquired the data from a large U.S. property and casualty insurance company. The
company o⁄ers multiple lines of insurance, including auto, home, and umbrella policies.
The full data set comprises yearly information on more than 400,000 households who held
auto or home policies between 1998 and 2006. For each household, the data contain all the
information in the company￿ s records regarding the household￿ s characteristics (other than
identifying information) and its policies (e.g., the limits on liability coverages, the deductibles
on property damage coverages, and the premiums associated with each coverage). The data
also record the number of claims that each household ￿led with the company under each of
its policies during the period of observation.
In this paper, we restrict attention to households who hold both auto and home policies
and we focus on three choices: (i) the deductible for auto collision coverage; (ii) the deductible
for auto comprehensive coverage; and (iii) the deductible for home all perils coverage.5 In
5Auto collision coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle caused by a collision with another vehicle
or object, without regard to fault. Auto comprehensive coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle
from all other causes (e.g., theft, ￿re, ￿ ood, windstorm, glass breakage, vandalism, hitting or being hit by
an animal, or by falling or ￿ ying objects), without regard to fault. If the insured vehicle is stolen, auto
3addition, we consider only the initial deductible choices of each household. This is meant
to increase con￿dence that we are working with active choices; one might be concerned that
some households renew their policies without actively reassessing their deductible choices.
Finally, we restrict attention to households who ￿rst purchased their auto and home policies
from the company in the same year, in either 2005 or 2006. These restrictions are meant
to avoid temporal issues, such as changes in household characteristics and in the economic
environment. In the end, we are left with a core sample of 4170 households. Table 1
provides descriptive statistics for the variables we use later to estimate the households￿
utility parameters.
TABLE 1
2.2 Deductibles and Premiums
For each household in the core sample, we observe the household￿ s deductible choices for auto
collision, auto comprehensive, and home, as well as the premiums paid by the household for
each type of coverage. In addition, the data contain the exact menus of premium-deductible
combinations that were available to each household at the time it made its deductible choices.
Table 2 summarizes the deductible choices of the households in the core sample. For each
coverage, the most popular deductible choice is $500. Table 3 summarizes the premium
menus. For each coverage, it describes, for all households, the premium for coverage with
a $500 deductible, as well as the marginal cost of decreasing the deductible from $500 to
$250 and the marginal bene￿t of increasing the deductible from $500 to $1000. (Tables A.1
through A.3 in the Appendix summarize the premium menus with households grouped by
their deductible choice.) The average annual premium for coverage with a $500 deductible
is $180 for auto collision, $115 for auto comprehensive, and $679 for home. The average
annual cost of decreasing the deductible from $500 to $250 is $54 for auto collision, $30
for auto comprehensive, and $56 for home. The average annual savings from increasing the
deductible from $500 to $1000 is $41 for auto collision, $23 for auto comprehensive, and $74
for home.
TABLES 2 & 3
As Table 3 suggests, there is considerable variation in premiums across households and
coverages. To illuminate the sources of such variation, we provide a generalized description
comprehensive coverage also provides a certain amount per day for transportation expenses (e.g., rental car
or public transportation). Home all perils coverage pays for damage to the insured home from all causes (e.g.,
￿re, windstorm, hail, tornadoes, vandalism, or smoke damage), except those that are speci￿cally excluded
(e.g., ￿ ood, earthquake, or war). For simplicity, we often refer to home all perils simply as home.
4of the plan the company uses to rate a policy in each line of coverage. First, upon observing
the household￿ s coverage-relevant characteristics, X, the company determines a benchmark
premium ￿ p (i.e., the premium associated with a benchmark deductible ￿ d) according to a
coverage-speci￿c rating function, ￿ p = f(X). The rating function takes into account, inter
alia, the household￿ s risk tier and any applicable discounts. For each coverage, the company
has roughly ten risk tiers. Assignment to a lower risk tier reduces the household￿ s benchmark
premium by a ￿xed percentage. These percentages are known in the industry as tier factors.
Second, the company generates a household-speci￿c menu f(pd;d) : d 2 Dg, which associates
a premium pd with each deductible d in the coverage-speci￿c set of deductible options D,
according to a coverage-speci￿c multiplication rule, pd = (g(d) ￿ ￿ p) + c, where g (￿) > 0
(with g(￿ d) = 1) and c > 0. The multiplicative factors fg(d) : d 2 Dg are known in the
industry as deductible factors, and c is known as an expense fee. The deductible factors
and the expense fees are coverage speci￿c but household invariant. Moreover, the expense
fees are ￿xed markups that do not depend on the deductibles. The company￿ s rating plan,
including its rating function and multiplication rule, are subject to state regulation. Among
other things, the regulations require that the company base its rating plan on actuarial
considerations (losses and expenses) and prohibit the company and its agents from charging
rates that depart from the company￿ s rating plan.6 It is safe to assume, therefore, that the
variation in premiums is exogenous to the households￿risk preferences, once we control for
household characteristics.
2.3 Claim Rates
For purposes of our analysis, we need to estimate each household￿ s (latent) claim rate for
each coverage. To estimate the claim rates, we use the full data set: 1,348,020 household-year
records for auto and 1,265,229 household-year records for home. For each household-year
record, the data record the number of claims ￿led by the household in that year. We estimate
a Poisson panel regression model with random e⁄ects for each of the three claim processes,
regressing the number of claims on a battery of observables. For each household in the core
sample, we use the regression estimates to generate a predicted annual claim rate for each
coverage, and we treat the predicted claim rates as the household￿ s true claim rates.7
More speci￿cally, we assume that claims follow a Poisson distribution at the household-
coverage level. That is, we assume that household i￿ s claims under coverage j in year t follow
6They also prohibit "excessive" rates and provide that insurers shall consider only "reasonable pro￿ts"
in making rates. See, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 2303, 2304 & 2314 (Consol. 2010), N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regis. tit. 11, § 160.2 (2010), and Dunham (2009, §§ 26.03 & 43.10).
7We note that our approach is closely related to the approach taken by Barseghyan et al. (forthcoming).
5a Poisson distribution with arrival rate ￿ijt. Under this assumption, the household￿ s claim
arrivals are independent within each coverage and across coverages. In addition, we assume
that deductible choices do not in￿ uence claim rates, i.e., households do not su⁄er from moral
hazard.8 We treat the claim rates as latent random variables and assume that
ln￿ijt = ￿jXijt + ￿ij;
where Xijt is a vector of observables,9 ￿ij is an unobserved iid error term, and exp(￿ij)
follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance ￿j. On the basis of the foregoing
assumptions, we perform standard Poisson panel regressions with random e⁄ects to obtain
maximum likelihood estimates of ￿j and ￿j for each coverage j. The estimates are reported
in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix. For each household i, we then use these estimates
to generate a predicted claim rate b ￿ij for each coverage j, conditional on the household￿ s (ex
ante) characteristics Xij and (ex post) claims experience.
Table 4 summarizes the predicted claim rates for the core sample. The mean predicted
claim rates for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home are 0:072, 0:021, and 0:089,
respectively, and there is substantial variation across households and coverages. Table 4 also
reports pairwise correlations among the predicted claim rates and between the predicted
claim rates and the premiums for coverage with a $500 deductible. Each of the pairwise
correlations is positive, as expected, though none are large.
TABLE 4
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we describe our theoretical framework. First, we develop a microeconomic
model of deductible choice. We then specify our econometric model, outline our estimation
procedure, and discuss identi￿cation.
3.1 A Microeconomic Model of Deductible Choice
We assume that a household treats its deductible choices as independent decisions. This
assumption is motivated, in part, by computational considerations,10 but also by the litera-
ture on "narrow bracketing" (e.g., Read et al. 1999), which suggests that when people make
8See infra footnotes 12 and 13.
9In addition to the variables in Table 1, Xijt includes numerous other variables (see Tables A.4 and A.5
in the Appendix).
10If instead we were to assume that a household treats its deductible choices as a joint decision, then the
household would face 180 options and the utility function would have over 350 terms.
6multiple choices, they frequently do not assess the consequences of all choices at once, but
rather tend to make each choice in isolation. Thus, we develop a model for how a household
chooses the deductible for a single type of insurance coverage. The coverage provides full in-
surance against covered losses in excess of the deductible. To simplify notation, we suppress
the subscripts for household and coverage (though we remind the reader that premiums and
claim rates are household and coverage speci￿c).
The household faces a menu of premium-deductible pairs f(pd;d) : d 2 Dg, where pd is
the premium associated with deductible d and D is the coverage-speci￿c set of deductible
options. In principle, over the course of the policy period, the household may experience
zero claims, one claim, two claims, three claims, and so forth. We assume that the number of
claims follow a Poisson distribution with arrival rate ￿, and, for simplicity, we assume that
each household experiences at most two claims.11 Hence, the probability of having zero claims
is ￿0 ￿ exp(￿￿), the probability of having one claim is ￿1 ￿ ￿exp(￿￿), and the probability
of having two or more claims is ￿2 ￿ 1￿￿0￿￿1. In addition, we assume that the household￿ s
choice of deductible does not in￿ uence ￿ (i.e., there is no moral hazard),12 and that every
claim exceeds the highest available deductible.13 Finally, we assume that the household
knows ￿ (or, alternatively, that its subjective belief about its claim rate corresponds to ￿).
Under the foregoing assumptions, the choice of deductible involves a choice among lotteries
of the form
Ld ￿ (￿pd;￿0;￿pd ￿ d;￿1;￿pd ￿ 2d;￿2);
to which we refer as deductible lotteries.
We allow for the possibility that the household￿ s preferences over deductible lotteries are
in￿ uenced by standard risk aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting. We
incorporate standard risk aversion and loss aversion by adopting the model of reference-
dependent preferences proposed by K‰ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). In the K‰ oszegi-Rabin
(KR) model, the utility from choosing lottery Y ￿ (yn;qn)N
n=1 given a reference lottery
~ Y ￿ (~ ym; ~ qm)M
m=1 is





qn~ qm [u(yn) + v(ynj~ ym)]:
11Because claim rates are small (typically less than 0.1, and almost always less than 0.3), the likelihood of
more than two claims is very small. Even for a claim rate of 0.3, for instance, the probability of more than
two claims is 0.0036.
12More speci￿cally, we assume there is neither ex ante moral hazard (deductible choice does not in￿ uence
the frequency of claimable events) nor ex post moral hazard (deductible choice does not in￿ uence the decision
to ￿le a claim).
13For arguments and evidence in support of the latter two assumptions, see Cohen and Einav (2007),
Sydnor (forthcoming), and Barseghyan et al. (forthcoming).
7The function u represents standard "intrinsic" utility de￿ned over ￿nal wealth states, and
standard risk aversion is captured by the concavity of u. The function v represents the "gain-
loss" utility that results from experiencing gains or losses relative to the reference point. For
v, we follow KR and use the functional form
v(yj~ y) =
(
￿ [u(y) ￿ u(~ y)] if u(y) > u(~ y)
￿￿[u(y) ￿ u(~ y)] if u(y) ￿ u(~ y)
:
In this formulation, the magnitude of gain-loss utility is determined by the intrinsic utility
gain or loss relative to consuming the reference point. Moreover, gain-loss utility takes a
two-part linear form, where ￿ ￿ 0 captures the importance of gain-loss utility relative to
intrinsic utility and ￿ ￿ 1 captures loss aversion. The model reduces to expected utility
when ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 1. But for ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 1, the household￿ s behavior is in￿ uenced by
risk aversion (via u) and loss aversion (via v).
KR propose that the reference lottery equals recent expectations about outcomes￿ i.e.,
if a household expects to face lottery ~ Y , then its reference lottery becomes ~ Y . However,
because situations vary in terms of when a household deliberates about its choices and when
it commits to its choices, KR o⁄er a number of solution concepts for the determination of
the reference lottery. We assume that the reference lottery is determined according to what
KR call a "choice-acclimating personal equilibrium" (CPE). Formally:
De￿nition (CPE). Given a choice set Y, a lottery Y 2 Y is a choice-acclimating personal
equilibrium if for all Y 0 2 Y, U(Y jY ) ￿ U(Y 0jY 0).
In a CPE, a household￿ s reference lottery corresponds to its choice. KR argue that CPE is
appropriate in situations where the household commits to a choice well in advance of the
resolution of uncertainty, and thus it knows that by the time the uncertainty is resolved
and it experiences utility, it will have become accustomed to its choice and hence expect
the lottery induced by its choice.14 In particular, KR suggest that CPE is the appropriate
solution concept for insurance applications.
Under the KR model using CPE, the utility to the household from choosing deductible
14The assumption that the household commits to its choice is important. Suppose instead that the
household has the opportunity to revise its choice just before the uncertainty is resolved. Then even after
"choosing" Y and coming to expect it, if U(Y 0jY ) > U(Y jY ) the household would want to revise its choice
just before the uncertainty is resolved. KR propose alternative solution concepts that are more appropriate
in such situations, where a household thinks about the problem in advance but does not commit to a choice
until just before the uncertainty is resolved.
8lottery Ld = (￿pd;￿0;￿pd ￿ d;￿1;￿pd ￿ 2d;￿2) is
U(LdjLd) = ￿0u(w ￿ pd) + ￿1u(w ￿ pd ￿ d) + ￿2u(w ￿ pd ￿ 2d) (1)
￿￿￿0￿1[u(w ￿ pd) ￿ u(w ￿ pd ￿ d)]
￿￿￿0￿2[u(w ￿ pd) ￿ u(w ￿ pd ￿ 2d)]
￿￿￿1￿2[u(w ￿ pd ￿ d) ￿ u(w ￿ pd ￿ 2d)];
where ￿ = ￿(￿￿1) and w is the household￿ s initial wealth. From equation (1), it is clear that
we can not separately identify the parameters ￿ and ￿. Instead, we estimate the product
￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿.15 We refer to ￿ as the coe¢ cient of "net" loss aversion.
Next, we incorporate nonlinear probability weighting. In their original prospect theory
paper, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that certain choice phenomena are best cap-
tured by nonlinear probability weighting, whereby individual probabilities are transformed
into decision weights. Their original approach, however, encounters problems￿ most no-
tably, violations of stochastic dominance￿ which Quiggin (1982) solves by proposing a rank-
dependent approach. Instead of transforming individual probabilities into decision weights,
the decumulative distribution of each lottery is transformed into a vector of decision weights
for that lottery, where the decision weights sum to one. Over the years, several forms of
nonlinear probability weighting have been proposed (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Lat-
timore et al. 1992; Prelec 1998). We adopt the rank-dependent approach of Quiggin (1982)
and use the one-parameter probability weighting function proposed by Prelec (1998).16
Formally, for deductible lottery Ld ￿ (￿pd;￿0;￿pd ￿ d;￿1;￿pd ￿ 2d;￿2), we assume the
decision weights are
!0 ￿ ￿(￿0)
!1 ￿ ￿(￿1 + ￿0) ￿ ￿(￿0)
!2 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(￿1 + ￿0);
where the probability weighting function ￿ is given by
￿(￿) = exp(￿(￿ln￿)
￿); (2)
15The inability to separately identify ￿ and ￿ applies to any application of CPE, and not just deductible
lotteries, because for any lottery Y , ￿ and ￿ appear in U(Y jY ) only as the product ￿(￿ ￿ 1). For other
solution concepts, ￿ and ￿ become separately identi￿ed.
16In Section 5.1, we con￿rm that our results are robust to a transformation of the cumulative distribution.
We also con￿rm the robustness of our results to several other probability weighting functions.
9with 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. Note that (2) nests standard linearity in the probabilities for ￿ = 1.17
Generalizing the KR model to allow for nonlinear probability weighting requires that we
specify the decision weights for both the chosen lottery and the reference lottery. KR o⁄er no
guidance on this modeling choice, as they abstract from nonlinear decision weights. To our
minds, it seems natural to assume that households treat the chosen lottery and the reference
lottery symmetrically. Accordingly, we assume that the decision weights are the same for
the chosen lottery and the reference lottery.
Given the foregoing assumptions, the household chooses a deductible lottery to maximize
equation (1), except that the claim probabilities ￿0, ￿1, and ￿2 are replaced by the decision
weights !0, !1, and !2.
3.2 Econometric Model
To specify our econometric model, we ￿rst must account for observationally equivalent house-
holds choosing di⁄erent deductibles. We follow McFadden (1974, 1981) and assume random
utility with additively separable choice noise. Speci￿cally, we assume that the utility from
deductible d 2 D is given by
V (d) ￿ ~ U(LdjLd) + "d; (3)
where ~ U(LdjLd) ￿ U(LdjLd)=u0(w) and "d is an iid random variable. In ~ U, we divide U by
u0(w) to normalize the scale of utility. The term "d represents error in evaluating utility (Hey
and Orme 1994). We assume that "d follows a type 1 extreme value distribution with scale
parameter ￿.18 Hence, a household chooses deductible d when V (d) > V (d0) for all d0 6= d,
or equivalently when
"d0 ￿ "d < ~ U(LdjLd) ￿ ~ U(Ld0jLd0) for all d
0 6= d:
The probability that the household chooses deductible d is
Pr(d) = Pr
￿














17Figure 1 depicts (2) for ￿ = 0:7 (our benchmark estimate).
18The scale parameter ￿ is a monotone transformation of the variance of "d, and thus a larger ￿ means
larger variance.
10In the estimation, we construct the likelihood function from these choice probabilities (see
Section 3.3).
Next, we must specify intrinsic utility u. In our main analysis, we follow Cohen and Einav
(2007) and Barseghyan et al. (forthcoming) and consider a second-order Taylor expansion











where r ￿ ￿u00(w)=u0(w) is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Applied to equation (1)










2 + !1(￿pd ￿ d)
2 + !2(￿pd ￿ 2d)
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!0!1 [(pd)2 ￿ (pd + d)2]
+!0!2 [(pd)2 ￿ (pd + 2d)2]





Note that because the term u(w)=u0(w) appears for all n, it does not a⁄ect the choice
probabilities, and thus the choice probabilities are independent of w.
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of equation (5) re￿ ects an expected value with
respect to the decision weights. The second term is due to standard risk aversion￿ it is the
sum of second-order di⁄erences in actual payo⁄s in the three states of the world, weighted
by their respective decision weights and scaled by the household￿ s standard risk aversion
parameter. The third term arises from loss aversion￿ because payment of the premium
occurs in all states of the world, it is not perceived as a loss under CPE. The last term is
the "interaction" term between loss aversion and standard risk aversion￿ because premium
payments do not directly a⁄ect the household￿ s utility through loss aversion, it is only the
second-order di⁄erences in payo⁄s, scaled by the standard risk aversion and net loss aversion
parameters, that are relevant for the household￿ s utility.
Note that, with this speci￿cation, we estimate a local approximation of the household￿ s
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. This approach is instrumental to our purposes, because
even with the scale normalization, u(w ￿ ￿)=u0(w) can depend on w, which we do not
observe (though we note that, in Section 4.2, we endeavor to account for wealth by using
11home value as a proxy).19 Moreover, this speci￿cation provides insight into important classes
of utility functions. In particular, it is an exact approximation for quadratic utilities, which
are commonly used in ￿nance, and it is an appropriate approximation for plausible CRRA
utilities￿ if u(w) = w1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), ￿ > 0, then for ￿ on the order of $1000, ￿ in the low
single digits, and wealth on the order of $100,000, each term in the full Taylor expansion of
u(w ￿ ￿) around w is roughly 1 percent of the magnitude of the prior term.
Finally, in our main analysis we assume that the household￿ s true claim rate ￿ corresponds
to its predicted claim rate b ￿ (see Section 2.3). Thus, the decision weights are speci￿ed as
!0 ￿ ￿(b ￿0)
!1 ￿ ￿(b ￿1 + b ￿0) ￿ ￿(b ￿0)
!2 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(b ￿1 + b ￿0);
where b ￿0 ￿ exp(￿b ￿), b ￿1 ￿ b ￿exp(￿b ￿), and ￿ is de￿ned by equation (2). We note that while
this approach captures heterogeneity in claim rates based on observables, it does not account
for potential unobserved heterogeneity, which could lead to ￿ 6= b ￿. In other words, even if
the household knows (or believes) ￿ to be its true claim rate (as we assume), the predicted
claim rate b ￿ may not correspond to ￿ due to unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, Cohen and
Einav (2007) and Barseghyan et al. (forthcoming) ￿nd evidence of unobserved heterogeneity
in claim rates, though in both studies the degree of unobserved heterogeneity is relatively
small. We endeavor to account for unobserved heterogeneity in an extension of our main
analysis (see Section 4.3).
3.3 Estimation Procedure
We observe data fDij;￿ijg, where Dij is household i￿ s deductible choice for coverage j and
￿ij ￿ (Zi;b ￿ij;Pij). In ￿ij, Zi is a vector of household characteristics, b ￿ij is household i￿ s
predicted claim rate for coverage j (as described in Section 2.3), and Pij denotes household
i￿ s menu of premiums for coverage j. In our benchmark speci￿cation, Zi comprises a constant
and the variables in Table 1, except for home value (see Section 4.1). In all speci￿cations,
Zi is a strict subset of the vector of observables Xij that we use to generate b ￿ij.
There are four model parameters to be estimated:
19Alternately, we could assume CARA utility, for which u(w ￿ ￿)=u0(w) is independent of w. While we
view CARA utility as too restrictive, we note that our main conclusions also hold for the CARA speci￿cation
(see Section 5.2).
12r ￿ the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion (r = 0 means no risk aversion);
￿ ￿ the coe¢ cient of net loss aversion (￿ = 0 means no loss aversion);
￿ ￿ the degree of nonlinear probability weighting (￿ = 1 means linearity); and
￿ ￿ the scale of choice noise (￿ = 0 means no choice noise).
In our main analysis, we assume that ￿ does not vary across households or coverages. How-




We estimate the model via maximum likelihood using combined data for all three cover-






1(Dij = d)ln[Pr(Dij = dj￿ij;￿)];
where ￿ = (￿r,￿￿;￿￿;￿), the indicator function selects the deductible chosen by household
i for coverage j, and Pr(Dij = dj￿ij;￿) denotes the choice probability in equation (4). We
estimate ￿ by maximizing
P
i ‘i (￿). We then use b ￿ to assign ￿tted values of ri, ￿i, and ￿i
to each household i.
As noted above, we assume that households treat their deductible choices as independent
decisions, and we also assume no coverage-speci￿c e⁄ects. In Section 5.5, we revisit these
assumptions by both estimating the model separately for each coverage and estimating the
model with coverage-speci￿c choice noise.
3.4 Identi￿cation
In this section, we demonstrate that if there is su¢ cient variation in premiums and claim
rates for a ￿xed array of observables Z, then the preference parameters r, ￿, and ￿ are
identi￿ed. We then argue that our data indeed contain signi￿cant variation in premiums
and claim rates even for a ￿xed Z.
The random utility model in equation (3) comprises the sum of a utility function ~ U(LdjLd)
and an error term "d. Using the results of Matzkin (1991), normalizations that ￿x scale and
location, plus regularity conditions that are satis￿ed in our model, allow us to identify
nonparametrically the utility function ~ U(LdjLd) within the class of monotone and concave
utility functions. A fortiori, this guarantees parametric identi￿cation of ~ U(LdjLd).
13This in turn allows us to separately identify standard risk aversion (r), net loss aversion
(￿), and nonlinear probability weighting (￿). To see the source of identi￿cation intuitively,
consider the following example. Suppose we observe that a household with a 10 percent
claim rate in auto collision chooses to pay $60 to decrease its deductible from $1000 to
$500. The household￿ s choice, which implies a lower bound on its maximum willingness to
pay (WTP) to decrease its expected loss from $100 to $50, is consistent with numerous
combinations of di⁄erent degrees of standard risk aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear
probability weighting.20 However, di⁄erent combinations yield di⁄erent implications for
other choices. For instance, di⁄erent combinations would imply di⁄erent lower bounds on
the household￿ s WTP to further decrease its auto collision deductible. They also would
imply di⁄erent lower bounds on the household￿ s WTP to decrease its deductible in other
coverages, for which the household has a di⁄erent claim rate. In short, di⁄erent combinations
of standard risk aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting have di⁄erent
implications for the observed distribution of deductibles, premiums, and claim rates.
Formally, then, we must demonstrate that the utility di⁄erences between deductible
choices react in di⁄erent ways to changes in the three preference parameters. Consider two
deductible options, a and b, and suppose that the probability of experiencing two claims is
negligible, so that !0 = ￿(￿0) = ￿(exp(￿￿)) = exp(￿￿￿) and !1 = 1 ￿ !0.21 Applying
equation (5) to this case, the di⁄erence in the household￿ s utility from choosing deductible
lotteries La and Lb is given by
~ U(LajLa) ￿ ~ U(LbjLb) = (pb ￿ pa) + !1 (b ￿ a) (6)





























We can rewrite equation (6) as






















20For the avoidance of doubt, throughout the paper we use WTP to denote maximum willingness to pay.
21These assumptions are without loss of generality. If the model is identi￿ed for the case where households
have two deductible options and can experience at most one claim, then it also is identi￿ed where households
have more than two deductible options and can experience more than one claim.
14where
￿(￿) ￿ [￿!0 + 1]!1
= [￿exp(￿￿
￿) + 1][1 ￿ exp(￿￿
￿)]:
From these equations, it is clear that variation in p and ￿ permits us to separately identify r
and ￿(￿), and then variation in ￿ permits us to separately identify ￿ and ￿.22 Thus, given
su¢ cient variation in premiums and claim rates for a ￿xed Z, the preference parameters are
identi￿ed.
We now argue that our data indeed contains signi￿cant variation in premiums and claim
rates even for a ￿xed Z. For each coverage, a household￿ s claim rates are determined by
factors beyond its vector of household characteristics Z. As described in Section 2.3, the
household￿ s predicted claim rate depends on a vector of observables X ￿ Z. More im-
portantly, the household￿ s menu of premiums is determined by factors beyond those that
determine the household￿ s claim rate. As explained in Section 2.2, the household￿ s menu
of premiums is a function not only of observables X but also other coverage-speci￿c vari-
ables, such as state regulations, the company￿ s tier and deductible factors (which are the
same for all households), and various discount programs. Consequently, there is variation
in premiums that is not driven by the variation in claim rates or in Z, and the variation in
claim rates does not arise solely because of the variation in Z.23 In the case of auto collision
coverage, for example, regressions of premiums and predicted claim rates on Z yield coe¢ -
cients of determination of 0.13 and 0.34, respectively, and the correlation coe¢ cient between
benchmark premiums (premiums for coverage with a $500 deductible) and predicted claim
rates is 0.35.24
In addition to the signi￿cant variation in premiums and claim rates within a coverage,
our data also contain signi￿cant variation in premiums and claim rates across coverages. A
key feature of our data is that for each household we observe deductible choices for three
coverages, and even for a ￿xed Z (and, in fact, even for a ￿xed X), there is signi￿cant
22This holds even if r is zero and the right-hand side of equation (7) collapses to (pb ￿ pa)+￿(￿)(b ￿ a).
23Moreover, it is safe to assume that, for a ￿xed Z, the variation in premiums and claims rates is exogenous
to the households￿risk preferences. Indeed, several of the variables in XnZ (such as distance to hydrant
and territory code (which the company bases on actuarial risk factors, such as weather patterns and wildlife
density)), as well as the additional variables that determine premiums (such as state law and the company￿ s
rating plan), are undoubtedly exogenous to the households￿risk preferences. Even if these variables were not
wholly exogenous, it is not clear that this would bias our results in favor of nonlinear probability weighting
and against standard risk aversion and loss aversion.
24The corresponding coe¢ cients for auto comprehensive and home are even lower. In the case of auto
comprehensive, the coe¢ cients of determination are 0.07 and 0.31, and the correlation coe¢ cient is 0.15. In
the case of home, the coe¢ cients of determination are 0.04 and 0.12, and the correlation coe¢ cient is 0.24.
15variation in premiums and claim rates across the three coverages. Indeed, even if the within-
coverage variation in p and ￿ was insu¢ cient in practice, we still might be able to separately
identify r, ￿, and ￿ using across-coverage variation.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents the results of our main analysis, including our benchmark estimates.
It also presents extensions in which we endeavour to account for wealth and for unobserved
heterogeneity in claim rates.
4.1 Benchmark Results
In our initial speci￿cation, we assume no heterogeneity (Zi includes only a constant). We
refer to this speci￿cation as Model 1. The estimates for standard risk aversion and loss
aversion are both e⁄ectively zero￿ the estimate for r is 3:1￿10￿10 (standard error: 8:7￿10￿9)
and the estimate for ￿ is 5:8 ￿ 10￿7 (standard error: 1:6 ￿ 10￿5). By contrast, the estimated
probability weighting parameter (￿) is 0:68 (standard error: 0:0027) which, as we illustrate
below, is economically large. While Model 1 is an oversimpli￿cation, it provides a clear
illustration of our main conclusion: nonlinear probability weighting plays the dominant role
in explaining the households￿deductible choices.
Table 5 reports the estimates for our benchmark speci￿cation, which we label Model 2.
Model 2 permits the preference parameters to depend on household characteristics. Speci￿-
cally, the covariates include a constant and all of the variables in Table 1,25 except for home
value. We view home value primarily as a proxy for wealth, and thus we introduce it below
when we endeavor to account for wealth. The top panel presents the coe¢ cient estimates
for the covariates, b ￿r, c ￿￿, and c ￿￿, as well as the estimate of the scale of choice noise, b ￿.
These estimates imply nontrivial heterogeneity in the underlying preference parameters and
nonzero choice noise. The bottom panel presents the mean and median of the ￿tted values
for the preference parameters, r, ￿, and ￿. For r, the median estimate is e⁄ectively zero,
though the mean estimate is somewhat larger at approximately 3:0 ￿ 10￿5.26 While this
implies nontrivial standard risk aversion, it does not imply "absurd" risk aversion in the
sense of Rabin (2000). For a household with wealth of $100;000, for example, a coe¢ cient
of absolute risk aversion of 3:0 ￿ 10￿5 implies a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of 3, a
25Each variable z is normalized as (z￿mean(z))=stdev(z).
26This is because certain types of households￿ particularly young, unmarried households￿ have larger
estimated standard risk aversion. Nevertheless, of the 4170 households in the core sample, only 8 are
assigned r > 0:001 and only 238 are assigned r > 0:0001.
16magnitude that many economists would consider plausible. For ￿, the mean and median
estimates are both e⁄ectively zero, suggesting that loss aversion plays little to no role in
explaining the data. For ￿, the mean and median estimates are both approximately 0:7,
which implies pronounced nonlinear probability weighting.
TABLE 5
4.1.1 Statistical Signi￿cance
A likelihood ratio test rejects at the 1 percent level both the null hypotheses of standard risk
neutrality (r = 0) and the null hypothesis of linear probability weighting (￿ = 1), suggesting
that both standard risk aversion and nonlinear probability weighting play a statistically
signi￿cant role in deductible choices. By contrast, a likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null
hypothesis of net loss neutrality (￿ = 0), which is consistent with loss aversion playing little
to no role. To test the relative statistical importance of standard risk aversion, loss aversion,
and nonlinear probability weighting, we also estimate restricted models and perform Vuong
(1989) model selection tests.27 We ￿nd that the model with nonlinear probability weighting
alone is "better" (at the 1 percent level) than (i) a model with standard risk aversion alone,
(ii) a model with loss aversion alone, and (iii) a model with both standard risk aversion and
loss aversion.
4.1.2 Economic Signi￿cance
To give a sense of the economic signi￿cance of our benchmark estimates for standard risk
aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting, we present the following "back-
of-the-envelope" calculations in Table 6. For selected claim rates ￿, column (1) contrasts the
probability of experiencing one claim, ￿1 = ￿exp(￿￿), with the associated decision weight,
!1 ￿ ￿(￿1 + ￿0) ￿ ￿(￿0), for the case where ￿ = 0:7. For instance, when the probability of
one claim is 2:0 percent, the decision weight is 6:0 percent; when the probability of one claim
is 6:5 percent, the decision weight is 13:0 percent; and when the probability of one claim is
12:9 percent, the decision weight is 19:3 percent.
Columns (2)-(9) display, for selected claim rates ￿ and various preference parameter
combinations, the dollar amount ￿ that would make a household with the utility function
27Vuong￿ s (1989) test allows one to select between two nonnested models on the basis of which best ￿ts
the data. Neither model is assumed to be correctly speci￿ed. Vuong (1989) shows that testing whether one
model is signi￿cantly closer to the truth (its loglikelihood value is signi￿cantly greater) than another model
amounts to testing the null hypothesis that the loglikelihoods have the same expected value.
17in equation (5) indi⁄erent between the following two deductible lotteries:
L1000 = (￿$200;￿0;￿$200 ￿ $1000;￿1;￿$200 ￿ $2000;￿2); and
L500 = (￿($200 + ￿);￿0;￿($200 + ￿) ￿ $500);￿1;￿($200 + ￿) ￿ $1000);￿2):
Lottery L1000 represents coverage with a $1000 deductible and a premium of $200, and L500
represents a policy with a $500 deductible and a premium of $200+￿. Thus, ￿ corresponds
to the household￿ s maximum willingness to pay (WTP), in terms of excess premium above
$200, to reduce its deductible from $1000 to $500.
As a benchmark, column (2) reports WTP for a standard risk-neutral household, with
r = 0, ￿ = 0, and ￿ = 1. Column (3) reports WTP for a household with r = 0, ￿ = 0, and
￿ = 0:7. It illustrates that the mean estimated degree of nonlinear probability weighting,
by itself, generates substantial aversion to risk, in the sense that the household￿ s WTP
is approximately two to three times larger than a standard risk-neutral household. For a
household with a claim rate of 7 percent, for example, moving from ￿ = 1 to ￿ = 0:7
increases the household￿ s WTP from $35 to $79.
Columns (4) and (5) reports WTP for a household with r = 0:00003, ￿ = 0, and either
￿ = 1 (column (4)) or ￿ = 0:7 (column (5)). Together, they illustrate that the mean
estimated degree of standard risk aversion has little per se e⁄ect on the household￿ s WTP.
For the household with a claim rate of 7 percent, for instance, moving from r = 0 to r =
0:00003 increases WTP by less than one dollar when ￿ = 1 and less than two dollars when
￿ = 0:7. In other words, columns (4) and (5) illustrate that, at our benchmark estimate,
standard risk aversion plays a small role in explaining the aversion to risk manifested in the
households￿deductible choices.
In order to establish certain benchmarks for later results, columns (6) and (7) report
WTP when the degree of standard risk aversion is r = 0:0001 and r = 0:001, respectively
(i.e., one and two orders of magnitude larger than our benchmark estimate), and column
(8) reports WTP when the degree of net loss aversion is ￿ = 0:02 (which is as large as
we ever ￿nd when we also allow for nonlinear probability weighting). In all three columns
￿ = 0:7. Increasing the degree of standard risk aversion to r = 0:0001 marginally increases
the household￿ s WTP (for the household with ￿ = 0:07, WTP increases from $79 to $85),
whereas increasing the degree of standard risk aversion to r = 0:001 substantially increases
the household￿ s WTP (for the household with ￿ = 0:07, WTP increases from $79 to $123).
Increasing the degree of net loss aversion to ￿ = 0:02 has little e⁄ect on the household￿ s
WTP (for the household with ￿ = 0:07, WTP increases from $79 to $82).
TABLE 6
184.1.3 Predicting Households￿Deductible Choices
For each household i and coverage j, the parameter estimates b ￿ imply a probability that the
household￿ s choice Dij for such coverage corresponds to the deductible d we observe in the
data (i.e., Pr(Dij = dj￿ij;b ￿) from Section 3.3). These choice probabilities provide a sense
of how the model performs in terms of predicting the households￿deductible choices. Table
7 describes these choice probabilities for each coverage. As a baseline, row (1) reports the
choice probabilities assuming households chose their deductibles uniformly at random.28
Row (2) reports the average of the model predicted choice probabilities across all house-
holds. Rows (3)-(7) provide a sense of how the model performs for di⁄erent deductibles. In
each row, the table reports the average choice probability among households who chose the
indicated deductible. The model performs best in explaining the more common, intermedi-
ate deductible choices, while it performs less well in explaining the less common, extreme
deductible choices.
Finally, rows (8) and (9) report the average choice probabilities for two restricted models.
Row (8) reports the average choice probabilities for a model with only nonlinear probability
weighting (i.e., when we estimate the model restricting r = ￿ = 0), while row (9) reports
the average choice probabilities for a model with only standard risk aversion (i.e., when we
restrict ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1). Comparisons with row (2) reveals that the model with only
nonlinear probability weighting performs almost as well as the full model, whereas the full
model comfortably outperforms the model with only standard risk aversion.
TABLE 7
4.2 Accounting for Wealth
As noted in Section 3.2, we do not directly observe the wealth of the households in the
data. Economists generally believe, however, that standard risk aversion depends on wealth.
In our benchmark results, we deal with this issue by estimating a local approximation of
absolute risk aversion. In this section, we endeavor to account for household wealth by using
home value as a proxy.
In Model 3, we take a naive, reduced-form approach and merely add home value to the
vector of observables, Zi, upon which a household￿ s preference parameters depend. That is,
Model 3 e⁄ectively assumes that a household￿ s intrinsic utility function depends on its wealth.
28For auto collision, there are ￿ve deductible levels, and so uniformly random choice would yield choice
probabilities of 20 percent for each deductible option. For auto comprehensive and home, there are six
deductible levels, and so uniformly random choice would yield choice probabilities of 16:7 percent for each
deductible option.
19However, economists typically do not assume that utility functions depend on wealth, but
rather that utility is a function of wealth (i.e., wealth is the domain of the utility function).
Hence, Model 3 is perhaps a misspeci￿ed model.
In Models 4 and 5, we take a structural approach, in which we assume constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility, i.e., u(w) = w1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), ￿ > 0. In the CRRA speci￿cation,
￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and thus ￿ = w ￿ r. We allow ￿ to depend on
household characteristics, Zi, assuming (as above) ln￿ = ￿￿Zi, and we take home value as
a proxy for wealth, to wit r = ￿=(home value) in equation (5). In Model 4, we estimate this
speci￿cation without also including home value in Zi; that is, we assume that the preference
parameters do not depend on home value other than through the relationship r = ￿=(home
value). However, because in addition to being a proxy for wealth, home value might also be
a signal of household type, in Model 5 we also include home value in Zi. Model 5 re￿ ects
our preferred approach to accounting for wealth.
Table 8 reports the mean and median of the ￿tted values for the preference parameters for
Models 3, 4, and 5.29 For comparison, the ￿rst panel restates the benchmark estimates from
Model 2. The second panel reports the estimates from Model 3. They are very similar to the
benchmark estimates, except in the case of standard risk aversion, where the mean estimate
is an order of magnitude larger, at approximately 3:8￿10￿4, and the median estimate now is
the same order of magnitude as the mean estimate, at approximately 2:5￿10￿4.30 But again,
we believe this is a misspeci￿ed model. The third and fourth panels report the estimates
for Models 4 and 5. The estimates for both models are nearly identical to the benchmark
estimates; the only substantive di⁄erence is that the mean and median estimates for standard
risk aversion are roughly twice as large as the benchmark estimates, although they have the
same order of magnitude. In terms of the direct impact of home value in Model 5, the
coe¢ cient estimates (which are reported in Table A.8 in the Appendix) suggest that home
value does not have a direct impact on the degree of standard risk aversion￿ the e⁄ect is
fully captured by the relationship r = ￿=(home value)￿ but that it does have a positive
and statistically signi￿cant relationship with the degree of nonlinear probability weighting,
suggesting that owning a more expensive home is associated with being closer to linear
probability weighting.
TABLE 8
29For the sake of brevity, Table 8 does not report the coe¢ cient estimates for the covariates. The complete
results, however, are reported in Tables A.6 through A.8 in the Appendix.
30As reported in Table A.6, we also ￿nd that standard risk aversion declines with home value, which is
consistent with the usual economic assumption that absolute risk aversion declines with wealth.
204.3 Accounting for Unobserved Heterogeneity in Claim Rates
In our main analysis, we assign to each household in the core sample a predicted claim rate
b ￿ for each coverage. While this approach allows for heterogeneity in claim rates based on
observable characteristics, it does not permit unobserved heterogeneity. Such unobserved
heterogeneity is potentially important, however, because it might help explain why obser-
vationally equivalent households choose di⁄erent deductibles. In order to account for unob-
served heterogeneity in claim rates, we expand our approach and assign to each household
its predicted distribution of claim rates for each coverage.
More speci￿cally, in Section 3 we derive a household￿ s choice probability as a function
of the household￿ s (latent) true claim rate ￿. In our benchmark analysis, we assume that,
for each coverage, the household￿ s true claim rate corresponds to its predicted claim rate b ￿,
which we calculate using the estimates from the claim rate regression for such coverage. We
then construct the likelihood function using the choice probabilities for all households; in
particular, we use the regression estimates to calculate the expected claim rate conditional
on the household￿ s observables. Of course, the claim rate regressions yield not only the
conditional expectation, but also the conditional distribution of claim rates. Hence, we can
use the regression estimates to assign to each household not just a predicted claim rate b ￿, but
also predicted claim rate distribution b F(￿). We can then construct the likelihood function
by integrating over b F(￿).31
Table 9 reports the mean and median of the preference parameter estimates for Models
2 and 5 (relabeled as Models 2u and 5u) when we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in
this way.32 The main message is roughly the same. Loss aversion is nonexistent. Nonlinear
probability weighting is statistically and economically signi￿cant, although it is somewhat
smaller in magnitude￿ the mean and median of the ￿tted values of ￿ are approximately 0:8
(rather than 0:7). Standard risk aversion is statistically signi￿cant, but now is economically
signi￿cant as well. The mean and median ￿tted values of r are approximately 1:0￿10￿3 and
5:7￿10￿4, respectively, in Model 2u and approximately 7:3￿10￿4 and 2:3￿10￿4, respectively,
in Model 5u. As Table 6 suggests, standard risk aversion of this order of magnitude implies
appreciable aversion to risk.
TABLE 9
31We compute this integral using the Gauss-Laguerre quadrature method.
32The complete results, with the coe¢ cient estimates for the covariates, are reported in Tables A.9 and
A.10 in the Appendix.
215 Sensitivity Analysis
Our analysis in Section 4 yields a clear main message: nonlinear probability weighting plays
the most important role in explaining the households￿deductible choices. More speci￿cally,
only nonlinear probability weighting is consistently statistically and economically signi￿cant;
standard risk aversion is consistently statistically signi￿cant but is economically signi￿cant
only in a subset of speci￿cations, and loss aversion is consistently estimated to be nonexistent.
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of these results to our modeling assumptions.
In general, we ￿nd that the results are quite robust to a variety of alternative assumptions.
The main result that varies across speci￿cations is the economic signi￿cance of standard risk
aversion. To conserve space, we only summarize the results of the sensitivity analysis below.
The complete results are available in the Appendix (Tables A.11 through A.23).
5.1 Form of Probability Weighting
As noted in Section 3.1, we incorporate nonlinear probability weighting into the model by (i)
adopting the rank-dependent approach of Quiggin (1982), which contemplates a transforma-
tion of the decumulative distribution, and (ii) using the one-parameter probability weighting
function proposed by Prelec (1998). In this section, we check the sensitivity of our results to
a transformation of the cumulative distribution and to other probability weighting functions.
In their cumulative prospect theory paper, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose a
rank-dependent approach to nonlinear probability weighting that contemplates a trans-
formation of the decumulative distribution for gains and the cumulative distribution for
losses. The point of their approach is that extreme outcomes (the largest gains and the
largest losses) are what get overweighted. In the case of our deductible lotteries, Ld =
(￿pd;￿0;￿pd ￿ d;￿1;￿pd ￿ 2d;￿2), which involve only losses, their approach implies the
following decision weights:
!2 ￿ ￿(￿2)
!1 ￿ ￿(￿1 + ￿2) ￿ ￿(￿2)
!0 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(￿1 + ￿2):
When we estimate Models 2 and 5 using these decision weights (and the Prelec (1998) one-
parameter probability weighting function), the mean and median of the estimated preference
parameters are essentially unchanged, except that mean estimate for standard risk aversion
in Model 5 is roughly half the magnitude (and the roughly same as in Model 2).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) also propose an alternative one-parameter probability
22weighting function: ￿(￿) = ￿￿=[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]1=￿. When we estimate Model 2 using their
probability weighting function (and, as they suggest, the cumulative form of rank depen-
dence), our main message is much the same. Nonlinear probability weighting is statistically
and economically signi￿cant￿ the mean and median estimates of ￿ are approximately 0:44
and 0:56, respectively, both of which are somewhat smaller (more nonlinear) than Tversky
and Kahneman￿ s median estimate of 0:69. (Figure 1 depicts the Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) function for ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:69, as well as the Prelec (1998) function for ￿ = 0:7.)
Standard risk aversion is statistically signi￿cant but economically insigni￿cant￿ the mean
estimate is 8:3 ￿ 10￿5 and the median estimate is e⁄ectively zero. The only apparent di⁄er-
ence is that the mean estimate for the coe¢ cient of net loss aversion is approximately 0:02
(though the median estimate still is zero). As Table 6 illustrates, however, loss aversion of
this magnitude is not economically signi￿cant.
FIGURE 1
Both the Prelec (1998) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighting func-
tions have the feature of implying hypersensitivity to small probability changes near the
extremes of the probability scale. It is not clear, however, whether there is good evidence
of such hypersensitivity. Because our data contain many observations of small claim prob-
abilities, we also consider a linear probability weighting function, ￿(￿) = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)=e.
Note that ￿(￿) intersects the 45 degree line at ￿ = 1=e (with ￿(￿) > ￿ for ￿ < 1=e and
￿(￿) < ￿ for ￿ > 1=e) for all values of ￿; this makes it comparable to the Prelec (1998)
one-parameter speci￿cation, which also intersects the the 45 degree line at 1=e for all values
of ￿. When we estimate Model 2 using this probability weighting function (and, as in our
benchmark analysis, the decumulative form of rank dependence), the preference parameter
estimates are e⁄ectively identical to the benchmark estimates.
Finally, each of the foregoing probability weighting functions captures two features￿
overweighting of small probabilities and insensitivity to probability changes￿ with a single
parameter. For this reason, we also consider the two-parameter probability weighting func-
tion suggested by Lattimore et al. (1992), ￿(￿) = a￿￿=[a￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿], where roughly a
captures overweighting and ￿ captures insensitivity.33 When we estimate Model 2 using this
speci￿cation (and the decumulative form of rank dependence), our main message emerges
yet again: nonlinear probability weighting is statistically and economically signi￿cant (the
estimates for a and ￿ are roughly 5 and 0:2, respectively), standard risk aversion is statisti-
33This function was used earlier by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987). As Gonzalez and Wu (1999) demon-
strate, it is equivalent to specifying that the log-odds ratio of the weighted probability be a linear function
of the log-odds ratio of the true probability.
23cally signi￿cant but economically small (the mean estimate is approximately 8:6 ￿ 10￿5 and
the median estimate is zero), and loss aversion is nonexistent.
In light of the robustness of our results to the form of probability weighting, the remainder
of our sensitivity analysis follows our main analysis and uses the decumulative form of rank
dependence and the Prelec (1998) one-parameter probability weighting function.
5.2 CARA Utility
In our main analysis, we account for initial wealth by using a second-order Taylor expansion
of the intrinsic utility function. Here we take an alternative approach: we assume constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility, u(w) = ￿exp(￿rw), in which case initial wealth is
irrelevant. When we estimate Model 3 with CARA utility￿ which, with CARA utility, is
the analogue for our Model 5 (our preferred approach to accounting for wealth)￿ our main
message is roughly the same. Loss aversion is nonexistent. Nonlinear probability weighting is
statistically and economically signi￿cant, although it is smaller in magnitude (more linear)￿
the mean and median of the ￿tted values of ￿ are approximately 0:9 and 0:8, respectively.
Standard risk aversion is statistically signi￿cant, but now is economically signi￿cant as well￿
the mean and median ￿tted values of r are 7:1￿10￿4 and 6:8￿10￿4, respectively. As between
Model 3 with CARA utility and Model 5, however, a Vuong (1989) test decidedly selects
Model 5 as the one which best ￿ts the data.
5.3 Maximum Number of Claims
Our main analysis permits that a household may have zero, one, or two claims. Given the
importance of nonlinear probability weighting in our results, one might worry that allowing
for the low probability event of experiencing two claims is having undue in￿ uence on our
results. Hence, we estimate Models 2 and 5 permitting households to have at most one
claim. The results tell the same basic story. The only noteworthy di⁄erence is that the
mean estimate for the coe¢ cient of net loss aversion in Model 5 is roughly 0:001 (though the
median estimate still is zero), but this is not economically signi￿cant.
5.4 Extreme Deductibles
Table 2 reveals that, for each coverage, the vast majority of households in the core sample
choose intermediate deductibles: 92.3 percent of households choose a deductible of $200,
$250, or $500 in auto collision; 87.1 percent of households choose a deductible of $200, $250,
or $500 in auto comprehensive; and 97.5 percent of households choose a deductible of $250,
24$500, or $1000 in home. Given these choice patterns, one might worry that households do
not really consider the more extreme deductible options, which might bias our estimates.34
To address this concern, we estimate Model 2 under the following conditions: (i) we restrict
the set of deductible options to f$200;$250;$500g for each of the auto coverages and to
f$250;$500;$1000g for home coverage; and (ii) for each coverage, if a household￿ s actual de-
ductible choice is outside the restricted choice set, we assign to the household the deductible
option from the restricted choice set that is closest to their actual deductible choice. The
results are essentially the same. The only appreciable di⁄erence is that mean and median es-
timates for standard risk aversion are somewhat larger: roughly 1:1￿10￿4 (which is borderline
economically signi￿cant) and 9:4 ￿ 10￿6 (which is not economically signi￿cant), respectively.
5.5 Coverage-Speci￿c Analysis
As noted in Section 3.3, our main analysis estimates risk preferences using combined data for
all three coverages. We believe this is the best approach because it enhances the variation in
premiums and claim rates. Nevertheless, we also investigate whether the benchmark results
are robust to estimating the model separately for each coverage. When we estimate Model 2
separately for each coverage, the main message is roughly the same. For auto comprehensive
coverage, the estimates for loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting nearly corre-
spond to the benchmark estimates, though there is economically signi￿cant standard risk
aversion (the mean and median estimates for r are approximately 1:7 ￿ 10￿3 and 1:4 ￿ 10￿3,
respectively). For home coverage, the estimates for nonlinear probability weighting are al-
most identical to the benchmark estimates, while there is a little more standard risk aversion
(the mean and median estimates are approximately 7:5 ￿ 10￿5 and 1:7 ￿ 10￿5, respectively)
and perhaps some loss aversion (the mean estimate for ￿ is approximately 0:006, but the
median estimate still is zero), though both are economically insigni￿cant. For auto collision
coverage, loss aversion is nonexistent, but there is more (and economically signi￿cant) stan-
dard risk aversion (the mean and median estimates for r are roughly 1:3￿10￿3 and 1:2￿10￿3,
respectively) and less nonlinear probability weighting (the mean and median estimates ￿ are
both roughly 0:9).
Even when we estimate risk preferences using combined data from all three coverages, a
second way to allow for coverage-speci￿c e⁄ects is to permit coverage-speci￿c choice noise
34For instance, when a household chooses a $200 deductible in auto comprehensive, we are using the fact
that it did not choose a $50 deductible to infer an upper bound on its aversion to risk. But if the household
in fact does not even consider the $50 deductible as an option, our inference would be invalid. Similarly,
when a household chooses a $1000 deductible in home, we are using the fact that it did not choose a $5000
deductible to infer a lower bound on its aversion to risk. Again, if the household in fact does not even
consider the $5000 deductible as an option, our inference would be invalid.
25(our main analysis assumes that choice noise (￿) does not vary across coverages). When we
estimate Model 2 with coverage-speci￿c choice noise, the results are nearly identical, except
that there is a little more standard risk aversion (the mean and median ￿tted values of r are
approximately 1:1 ￿ 10￿4 and 7:0 ￿ 10￿5, respectively).
6 Discussion
We develop a structural model of risky choice that incorporates standard risk aversion (con-
cave utility over ￿nal wealth), loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting, and we
estimate the model using data on households￿deductible choices in auto and home insurance.
We ￿nd that nonlinear probability weighting plays the most important role in explaining the
data, while standard risk aversion plays a small role and loss aversion plays little to no role.
Insofar as they are generalizable, our results suggest that risk preferences are shaped ￿rst
and foremost by how one evaluates risk and only second by how one evaluates outcomes.
Perhaps the main takeaway of the paper is that economists should pay greater attention
to the question of how people evaluate risk. Prospect theory incorporates two key features:
a value function that describes how people evaluate outcomes and a probability weighting
function that describes how people evaluate risk. The behavioral economics literature, how-
ever, has focused primarily on the value function, and there has been relatively little focus on
probability weighting.35 In light of our work, as well as the work discussed in Section 1 that
reaches a similar conclusions using di⁄erent methods (Bruhin et al., forthcoming; Snowberg
and Wolfers, forthcoming; Kliger and Levy 2009), it seems clear that the literature ought to
reevaluate its focus.36
That said, it is worth highlighting certain limitations of our analysis. An important
limitation is that, while our analysis clearly indicates that the main "action" lies in how peo-
ple evaluate risk, it does not enable us to say whether households are engaging in nonlinear
probability weighting per se￿ i.e., they know the probabilities but weight them nonlinearly￿
or whether their subjective beliefs simply do not correspond to the objective probabilities.
Relatedly, it is not clear that nonlinear probability weighting is the best way to model
how people evaluate risk. Indeed, there are a variety of other models that take di⁄er-
ent approaches￿ the leading examples include models of ambiguity averse preferences (e.g.,
35Two prominent review papers￿ an early paper that helped set the agenda for behavioral economics
(Rabin 1998) and a recent paper that surveys the current state of empirical behavioral economics (DellaVigna
2009)￿ contain almost no discussion of probability weighting. The behavioral ￿nance literature has paid a
more attention to probability weighting (see, e.g., Barberis and Huang 2008; Barberis 2010)
36Indeed, Prelec (2000) conjectured that "probability nonlinearity will eventually be recognized as a more
important determinant of risk attitudes than money nonlinearity."
26Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; Schmeidler 1989; Klibano⁄ et al. 2005). An important avenue
of future research, therefore, is to investigate di⁄erent accounts of how people evaluate risk
and uncertainty.
A second limitation is that our analysis relies exclusively on insurance deductible choices,
and it is unclear the extent to which our conclusions generalize to other choices or settings.
While we suspect that our main message would resonate in many domains beyond insurance
deductible choices, it is evident that our estimated model would not perform well in certain
contexts. In particular, people often display aversion to risk in 50-50 positive expected value
gambles￿ e.g., people frequently reject gambles with a 50 percent chance to win $110 and a
50 percent chance to lose $100. It seems clear that nonlinear probability weighting does not
explain such aversion to risk.
A third limitation pertains to the way we account for observationally equivalent house-
holds choosing di⁄erent deductibles. As described in Section 3.2, we specify a random utility
model with additively separable choice noise. There are alternative approaches, however,
including the random error (or tremble) model (Harless and Camerer 1994) and the ran-
dom preference model (Loomes and Sugden 1995), though neither is clearly superior to ours
(Loomes and Sugden 1998; Loomes et al. 2002). It would be useful nevertheless to explore
these and perhaps other approaches in future work, particularly in light of recent work on
the stability of risk preferences (Barseghyan et al., forthcoming; Einav et al. 2010).
It is also worth clarifying our conclusion that loss aversion plays little to no role in
explaining the households￿deductible choices. What we ￿nd is little to no role for K‰ oszegi-
Rabin loss aversion￿ that is, loss aversion wherein gains and losses are de￿ned relative to
recent expectations, which in turn are determined by the chosen option. We ￿nd this result
intriguing, because K‰ oszegi and Rabin (2007) and Sydnor (forthcoming) hypothesize that
KR loss aversion is implicated in insurance deductible choices. Nonetheless, our analysis does
not contradict the original, "status quo" loss aversion proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979)￿ that is, loss aversion wherein gains and losses are de￿ned relative to initial wealth. In
the context of insurance deductible choices, because all outcomes are losses relative to initial
wealth, status quo loss aversion is inapposite. However, it is probably the best explanation
for aversion to 50-50 positive expected value gambles.
Finally, we highlight that our benchmark estimates are immune to the Rabin critique
(Rabin 2000). Rabin uses a calibration argument to demonstrate the inability of the standard
expected utility model to explain appreciable aversion to gambles with moderate stakes￿
e.g., rejecting a gamble involving equal chances to win $110 and lose $100￿ because it implies
an "absurd" degree of risk aversion when the stakes are increased by one or two orders of
27magnitude.37 Ex ante (before confronting the data) our analysis could have yielded absurdly
high levels of risk aversion￿ i.e., in our estimation procedure, the parameter space allowed
for any degree of risk aversion. As we demonstrate in Section 4, however, our benchmark
estimate for standard risk aversion implies a plausibly small level of aversion to risk (both in
terms of the implied coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the implied willingness to pay for
lower deductibles). At the same time, the degree of probability weighting is independent of
stakes, and thus increases in stakes have little e⁄ect on risk attitudes.38 We hope to pursue
this theme in future research by exploiting the fact that our data set records both deductible
choices, which involve moderate stakes, and liability limit choices, which involve stakes that
are orders of magnitude larger.
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Figure 1: Probability Weighting Functions
Notes￿ The black curve is the Prelec (1998) function with ￿ = 0:7. The red and green curves
are the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) function with ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:69, respectively. The
dashed line is the 45 degree line.
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Driver 1 credit score 766 113 530 987
Driver 2 indicator 0.42




33Deductible Collision Comp Home
$50 5.2
$100 1.0 4.1 0.9
$200 13.4 33.5
$250 11.2 10.6 29.7
$500 67.7 43.0 51.9






34Coverage Mean Std Dev 1st Pctl 99th Pctl
Auto collision premium for $500 deductible 180 100 50 555
Auto comprehensive premium for $500 deductible 115 81 26 403
Home all perils premium for $500 deductible 679 519 216 2511
Cost of decreasing deductible from $500 to $250:
Auto collision 54 31 14 169
Auto comprehensive 30 22 6 107
Home all perils 56 43 11 220
Savings from increasing deductible from $500 to $1000:
Auto collision 41 23 11 127
Auto comprehensive 23 16 5 80





Mean 0.072 0.021 0.089
Standard deviation 0.026 0.011 0.053
1st percentile 0.026 0.004 0.025
5th percentile 0.035 0.007 0.034
25th percentile 0.053 0.013 0.054
Median 0.069 0.019 0.079
75th percentile 0.087 0.027 0.110
95th percentile 0.120 0.042 0.177
99th percentile 0.150 0.056 0.265
Correlations Collision Comp Home
Collision 1
Comp 0.13 1
Home 0.27 0.19 1




Constant ‐16.06 ** 0.95 ‐12.19 * 6.70 ‐0.40 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐0.60 ** 0.26 2.91 ** 1.45 ‐0.04 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.92 ** 0.22 ‐1.89 7.33 0.01 0.00
Driver 1 female ‐0.18 0.20 ‐0.44 1.99 ‐0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single 0.06 0.27 0.83 1.32 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐4.32 ** 0.75 0.48 1.15 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.01 0.21 0.14 2.87 ‐0.06 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator ‐0.14 1.34 ‐1.83 2.11 0.03 * 0.01
Std Err













37(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
r=0 r=0 r=0.00003 r=0.00003 r=0.0001 r=0.001 r=0.00003
Λ=0 Λ=0 Λ=0 Λ=0 Λ=0 Λ=0 Λ=0.02
α=0.7 α=1 α=0.7 α=1 α=0.7 α=0.7 α=0.7 α=0.7
μ μ1 ω1 WTP WTP WTP WTP WTP WTP WTP
0.02 0.020 0.060 10.00 32.59 10.22 33.32 35.00 52.01 33.95
0.05 0.048 0.107 24.99 62.31 25.55 63.72 66.92 97.83 64.86
0.07 0.065 0.130 34.97 79.13 35.75 80.94 84.99 123.10 82.34
0.10 0.090 0.158 49.92 102.02 51.03 104.34 109.54 156.70 106.08







(1) Random choice 0.200 0.167 0.167
(2) Full model ‐ all households 0.333 0.234 0.377
(3) Full model ‐ policies with $50 or $100 deductible 0.194 0.139 0.089
(4) Full model ‐ policies with $200 or $250 deductible 0.235 0.192 0.440
(5) Full model ‐ policies with $500 deductible 0.377 0.279 0.337
(6) Full model ‐ policies with $1000 deductible 0.269 0.439 0.427
(7) Full model ‐ policies with $2500 or $5000 deductible 0.125
(8) Restricted model (r=Λ=0) ‐ all households 0.332 0.234 0.376
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Cornell University Georgetown University
July 21, 2010$100 $200 $250 $500 $1000 All
Mean annual premium for coverage with $500 deductible 110 129 146 189 255 180
Standard deviation 54 54 66 96 168 100
Mean cost of decreasing deductible from $500 to $250 33 38 44 57 77 54
Standard deviation 17 17 20 29 52 31
Mean savings from increasing deductible from $500 to $1000 24 29 33 43 58 41
Standard deviation 12 12 15 22 39 23
Number of households 42 559 467 2822 280 4170
Note: All values in dollars, except number of households.
$50 $100 $200 $250 $500 $1000
Mean annual premium for coverage with $500 deductible 61 70 92 98 136 258
Standard deviation 27 33 43 41 71 247
Mean cost of decreasing deductible from $500 to $250 16 18 24 26 36 68
Standard deviation 7 9 11 11 19 66
Mean savings from increasing deductible from $500 to $1000 12 14 18 19 27 51
Standard deviation 5798 1 4 4 9
Number of households 216 171 1397 440 1795 151
Note: All values in dollars, except number of households.
$100 $250 $500 $1000 $2500 $5000
Mean annual premium for coverage with $500 deductible 366 520 631 972 2218 3366
Standard deviation 113 218 308 593 2289 1808
Mean cost of decreasing deductible from $500 to $250 31 42 52 80 183 275
Standard deviation 6 18 26 48 201 140
Mean savings from increasing deductible from $500 to $1000 41 57 69 107 244 368
Standard deviation 8 23 34 64 268 188












Constant ‐6.7646 ** 0.0616 ‐7.9277 ** 0.1057
Driver 2 Indicator ‐0.0485 0.0593 ‐0.3542 ** 0.1022
Driver 3+ Indicator 0.3215 ** 0.0733 ‐0.1261 0.1201
Vehicle 2 Indicator 0.5991 ** 0.0466 0.6502 ** 0.0782
Vehicle 3+ Indicator 0.7312 ** 0.0596 0.8766 ** 0.0937
Young Driver ‐0.0058 0.0296 0.0895 ** 0.0453
Driver 1 Age ‐0.0210 ** 0.0015 0.0113 ** 0.0029
Driver 1 Age Squared 0.0002 ** 0.0000 ‐0.0002 ** 0.0000
Driver 1 Female 0.1040 ** 0.0093 ‐0.0672 ** 0.0168
Driver 1 Married 0.0630 ** 0.0111 0.0640 ** 0.0201
Driver 1 Divorced 0.0186 0.0141 0.0914 ** 0.0247
Driver 1 Separated 0.0392 0.0256 0.0791 0.0428
Driver 1 Single ....
Driver 1 Widowed 0.0031 0.0160 ‐0.0170 0.0335
Vehicle 1 Age ‐0.0354 ** 0.0019 ‐0.0286 ** 0.0030
Vehicle 1 Age Squared ‐0.0006 ** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002
Vehicle 1 Business ....
Vehicle 1 Farm ‐0.2575 ** 0.0872 0.0206 0.1194
Vehicle 1 Pleasure ‐0.1094 ** 0.0306 ‐0.1118 ** 0.0526
Vehicle 1 Work ‐0.0831 ** 0.0304 ‐0.0620 0.0523
Vehicle 1 Passive Restraint ‐0.1087 ** 0.0239 ‐0.0858 ** 0.0352
Vehicle 1 Anti‐Theft 0.0754 ** 0.0078 0.0735 ** 0.0136
Vehicle 1 Anti‐Lock 0.0581 ** 0.0080 0.0729 ** 0.0139
Driver 2 Age 0.0115 ** 0.0024 0.0181 ** 0.0042
Driver 2 Age Squared ‐0.0001 ** 0.0000 ‐0.0001 ** 0.0000
Driver 2 Female 0.1204 ** 0.0151 ‐0.0376 0.0257
Driver 2 Married ‐0.0835 ** 0.0191 ‐0.0408 0.0326
Driver 2 Divorced ‐0.1579 0.1027 ‐0.1347 0.1636
Driver 2 Separated 0.0254 0.2130 0.1796 0.3226
Driver 2 Single ....
Driver 2 Widowed ‐0.0802 0.1383 ‐1.1835 ** 0.3864
Vehicle 2 Age ‐0.0332 ** 0.0016 ‐0.0229 ** 0.0027
Vehicle 2 Age Squared 0.0004 ** 0.0001 0.0002 ** 0.0001
Vehicle 2 Business ....
Vehicle 2 Farm ‐0.1703 0.1056 ‐0.1345 0.1500
Vehicle 2 Pleasure ‐0.1805 ** 0.0380 ‐0.0563 0.0663
Vehicle 2 Work ‐0.1670 ** 0.0381 0.0119 0.0664
Vehicle 2 Passive Restraint ‐0.0428 ** 0.0201 ‐0.0875 ** 0.0294
Vehicle 2 Anti‐Theft 0.0547 ** 0.0103 0.0385 ** 0.0171
Vehicle 2 Anti‐Lock 0.0317 ** 0.0105 0.0199 0.0170
Driver 1 Credit Score ‐0.0017 ** 0.0000 ‐0.0013 ** 0.0001
Driver 1 Previous Accident 0.0913 ** 0.0156 0.0756 ** 0.0277
Driver 1 Previous Convictions 0.1476 0.0888 0.0648 0.1670
Driver 1 Previous Reinstated 0.0170 0.0558 0.0003 0.0996
Driver 1 Previous Revocation ‐0.0218 0.1456 0.3156 0.1967
Driver 1 Previous Suspension 0.0463 0.0564 0.0125 0.1026
Driver 1 Previous Violation 0.0827 ** 0.0093 0.0577 ** 0.0161
Year Dummies
Territory Codes
















Constant ‐7.3642 ** 0.0978
Dwelling Value 0.0000 ** 0.0000
Home Age 0.0016 ** 0.0006
Home Age Squared 0.0000 ** 0.0000
Number of Families ‐0.0021 0.0023
Distance to Hydrant 0.0000 0.0000
Alarm Discount 0.2463 ** 0.0195
Protection Devices ‐0.1852 ** 0.0239
Farm/Business 0.1044 ** 0.0242
Primary Home 0.4832 ** 0.0819
Owner Occupied 0.2674 ** 0.0419
Construction: Fire Resist 0.1525 0.1342
Construction: Masonry 0.0751 ** 0.0172
Construction: Masonry/Veneer 0.0755 ** 0.0252
Construction: Frame . .
















Constant ‐8.61 ** 0.21 ‐17.00 ** 4.24 ‐0.34 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐0.64 ** 0.11 0.77 3.44 ‐0.07 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.02 0.07 ‐0.26 2.45 0.01 0.00
Driver 1 female ‐0.11 0.07 0.79 1.03 ‐0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single 0.14 0.09 ‐0.81 1.59 0.01 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐0.09 0.15 ‐0.50 1.07 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.03 0.07 ‐0.98 1.26 ‐0.06 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator 0.41 0.28 5.71 ** 1.15 0.03 0.02
Home value ‐1.20 ** 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.00 0.00
Std Err






Constant ‐3.48 2.60 ‐14.97 ** 2.24 ‐0.41 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐6.76 ** 3.21 ‐0.79 6.25 ‐0.05 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared ‐1.28 1.02 ‐1.12 5.79 0.01 ** 0.00
Driver 1 female ‐0.37 ** 0.16 ‐1.24 1.80 ‐0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.12 0.21 ‐2.91 6.25 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐0.44 0.32 2.60 4.99 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.10 0.17 0.89 3.67 ‐0.06 ** 0.00
Driver 2 present 0.43 0.53 ‐0.54 3.54 0.03 * 0.01
Std Err






















Constant ‐3.93 ** 0.62 ‐19.65 ** 3.01 ‐0.41 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐7.09 ** 0.58 ‐0.89 10.67 ‐0.05 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared ‐1.34 ** 0.28 ‐9.95 7.02 0.01 ** 0.00
Driver 1 female ‐0.40 ** 0.18 1.09 2.04 ‐0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.11 0.24 ‐0.47 1.09 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐0.42 0.34 ‐3.96 4.78 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.07 0.17 0.30 1.44 ‐0.06 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator 0.35 0.52 0.15 1.72 0.02 ** 0.00
Home value 0.03 0.14 1.34 ** 0.35 0.02 0.02
Std Err













Constant ‐7.37 ** 0.17 ‐17.00 ** 2.04 ‐0.23 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐0.98 ** 0.13 ‐4.42 4.49 ‐0.10 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.11 0.08 ‐9.87 ** 1.56 0.01 * 0.01
Driver 1 female 0.16 * 0.10 ‐5.40 ** 2.21 0.01 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.02 0.11 0.31 1.56 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married 0.19 0.15 4.75 2.97 0.01 0.01
Driver 1 credit score ‐0.09 0.09 ‐0.85 3.24 ‐0.07 * 0.01
Driver 2 indicator ‐0.32 0.22 1.07 1.67 0.01 0.02
Std Err







Constant 3.87 ** 0.25 ‐22.52 ** 3.12 ‐0.27 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐1.55 ** 0.18 8.70 ** 1.84 ‐0.10 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.00 0.11 ‐12.80 ** 4.44 0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 female ‐0.22 ** 0.10 0.24 2.12 ‐0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.09 0.11 ‐0.90 2.85 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 married 0.20 0.16 ‐2.91 3.12 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.06 0.09 1.87 2.86 ‐0.06 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator ‐0.64 ** 0.30 ‐1.15 1.34 0.00 0.02
Home value ‐0.02 0.06 ‐1.99 ** 0.74 ‐0.01 ** 0.00
Std Err




















Constant ‐13.99 ** 1.98 ‐11.67 ** 4.14 ‐0.37 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐3.97 ** 0.87 1.43 1.33 ‐0.04 ** 0.00
Driver 1 age squared ‐0.76 ** 0.38 ‐5.03 ** 2.09 0.00 0.00
Driver 1 female 0.22 0.19 ‐0.08 1.06 ‐0.01 ** 0.00
Driver 1 single 0.01 0.17 ‐1.33 1.05 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐1.71 1.97 0.69 1.04 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.49 ** 0.22 1.61 1.81 ‐0.04 ** 0.00
Driver 2 indicator ‐5.05 4.69 ‐2.07 1.24 0.02 0.01
Std Err






Constant ‐8.06 * 4.70 ‐12.45 ** 1.32 ‐0.38 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐4.91 ** 2.02 0.27 1.00 ‐0.04 ** 0.00
Driver 1 age squared ‐0.86 0.74 ‐1.35 1.12 0.00 0.00
Driver 1 female ‐0.12 0.27 ‐0.43 1.03 ‐0.01 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.12 0.23 ‐0.29 1.01 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐6.45 ** 3.19 0.40 3.71 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.34 0.34 0.14 1.04 ‐0.04 ** 0.00
Driver 2 indicator ‐7.67 ** 2.34 0.38 1.01 0.02 0.01
Home value 0.46 ** 0.13 ‐0.12 1.02 0.01 ** 0.00
Std Err





















Constant ‐15.63 ** 1.42 ‐21.00 ** 4.13 ‐0.45 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐2.16 ** 0.25 15.17 ** 4.80 ‐0.03 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared ‐1.40 0.52 ‐5.13 ** 1.85 ‐0.03 ** 0.01
Driver 1 female ‐0.80 0.52 ‐0.21 0.42 ‐0.03 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.27 0.30 ‐0.83 0.97 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐3.08 ** 1.19 ‐1.99 ** 0.42 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 2.57 ** 0.61 0.17 0.19 ‐0.04 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator ‐0.93 2.35 10.01 ** 3.91 ‐1.12 ** 0.02
Std Err






Constant ‐12.03 ** 0.51 ‐11.11 ** 2.81 ‐0.31 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐0.56 ** 0.16 3.90 4.19 ‐0.03 ** 0.00
Driver 1 age squared 0.97 ** 0.09 ‐6.49 ** 2.85 0.01 ** 0.00
Driver 1 female ‐0.16 0.17 1.66 1.60 ‐0.01 ** 0.00
Driver 1 single 0.00 0.23 0.32 6.30 0.00 0.00
Driver 1 married ‐0.47 ** 0.42 0.80 3.70 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.05 ** 0.18 0.81 3.72 ‐0.04 ** 0.00
Driver 2 indicator ‐6.67 ** 1.10 ‐2.20 2.80 0.01 0.01
Std Err




















A-8Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
Constant ‐18.91 ** 2.18 ‐12.73 ** 1.00 1.42 ** 0.08 ‐1.39 ** 0.07
Driver 1 age ‐1.87 * 1.07 0.04 0.99 ‐0.17 ** 0.04 0.08 * 0.04
Driver 1 age squared ‐0.20 0.42 ‐0.01 1.00 0.11 ** 0.03 ‐0.09 ** 0.03
Driver 1 female 0.26 ** 0.10 ‐0.03 1.00 0.03 0.05 ‐0.07 0.05
Driver 1 single 0.16 0.10 0.02 1.00 0.07 0.05 ‐0.06 0.06
Driver 1 married ‐8.70 ** 2.08 ‐0.01 1.00 ‐0.12 * 0.07 0.08 0.07
Driver 1 credit score 0.03 0.09 ‐0.01 1.00 ‐0.12 ** 0.03 0.08 ** 0.03
Driver 2 indicator ‐0.40 1.03 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.11
Std Err






0.0000000 0.0000 4.954 0.230
Coef Coef Coef Coef
Coef
0.0000864 0.0000 4.996 0.235
Table A.15: Model 2 with Lattimore et al. (1992) Probability Weighting Function
Core Sample (4170 Households)
r Λ a δ
A-9Std Err Std Err Std Err
Constant ‐7.34 ** 0.05 ‐11.40 17.94 ‐0.21 ** 0.03
Driver 1 age ‐0.07 ** 0.02 ‐0.55 1.00 ‐0.09 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.18 ** 0.02 ‐0.20 1.01 0.06 ** 0.01
Driver 1 female 0.09 ** 0.02 0.00 1.02 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 single 0.05 ** 0.02 0.25 1.00 0.03 ** 0.01
Driver 1 married 0.07 0.04 ‐0.68 1.00 0.04 0.02
Driver 1 credit score ‐0.04 0.03 0.17 1.01 ‐0.09 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator ‐0.35 ** 0.07 0.61 1.00 ‐0.10 ** 0.04
Home value ‐0.06 ** 0.00 ‐0.04 1.00 0.21 ** 0.01
Std Err






Constant ‐13.80 ** 2.30 ‐19.72 ** 2.49 ‐0.47 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐4.62 ** 1.25 ‐0.56 1.66 ‐0.06 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared ‐1.00 ** 0.49 ‐7.03 * 3.73 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 female 0.24 0.20 ‐1.41 2.14 ‐0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.02 0.18 ‐0.02 1.03 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐1.54 2.21 4.12 ** 1.54 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.39 0.24 ‐0.86 1.12 ‐0.05 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator ‐6.12 6.10 ‐3.13 2.74 0.02 0.02
Std Err





















Constant ‐3.87 3.60 ‐27.16 ** 2.80 ‐0.48 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐7.29 * 4.42 ‐11.04 ** 1.88 ‐0.06 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared ‐1.44 1.38 ‐6.41 ** 1.96 0.01 ** 0.01
Driver 1 female ‐0.37 ** 0.18 9.11 ** 1.19 ‐0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.19 0.24 6.32 ** 2.11 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐0.45 0.37 11.60 ** 2.13 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.10 0.18 1.94 ** 0.88 ‐0.05 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator 0.30 0.56 ‐12.63 ** 1.71 0.02 ** 0.02
Home value 0.02 0.14 2.43 ** 0.41 0.01 0.00
Std Err







Constant ‐11.85 ** 1.47 ‐21.49 14.72 ‐0.45 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐3.59 * 1.85 0.53 8.25 ‐0.09 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared ‐0.57 0.60 ‐15.34 12.03 0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 female ‐0.08 0.13 1.67 9.88 ‐0.01 * 0.01
Driver 1 single 0.24 0.22 1.95 14.84 0.01 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐0.14 0.30 ‐0.94 24.75 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.02 0.13 1.58 2.77 ‐0.06 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator 0.21 0.46 10.42 12.90 0.02 0.02
Std Err





















Constant ‐6.82 ** 0.14 ‐11.72 39.66 ‐0.20 ** 0.02
Driver 1 age ‐0.43 ** 0.08 1.83 2.89 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.01 0.06 ‐5.92 ** 2.73 0.01 0.01
Driver 1 female 0.15 ** 0.07 0.94 5.40 0.02 * 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.08 0.07 ‐0.39 7.81 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 married 0.10 0.09 1.48 1.84 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.15 * 0.08 0.93 8.39 ‐0.03 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator 0.16 0.17 ‐1.73 3.33 0.10 ** 0.02
Std Err







Constant ‐6.70 ** 0.20 ‐10.39 ** 2.82 ‐0.37 ** 0.02
Driver 1 age ‐0.21 ** 0.08 1.44 2.54 ‐0.09 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.18 ** 0.06 ‐2.17 12.66 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 female 0.28 0.07 0.11 2.16 0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single 0.02 0.09 1.16 3.52 ‐0.02 * 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐0.09 ** 0.14 0.02 1.12 ‐0.02 0.02
Driver 1 credit score ‐0.01 0.09 0.07 12.33 ‐0.03 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator 0.06 0.26 ‐0.93 1.18 0.03 0.03
Std Err





















Constant ‐11.29 ** 0.53 ‐22.00 ** 5.92 ‐0.40 ** 0.02
Driver 1 age ‐0.51 ** 0.18 14.98 ** 5.79 ‐0.07 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.96 ** 0.17 ‐6.08 ** 2.82 0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 female 0.26 0.19 4.08 2.86 ‐0.02 ** 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.05 0.20 ‐2.22 1.70 0.01 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐0.49 0.39 1.41 ** 0.70 0.00 0.02
Driver 1 credit score 0.17 0.23 ‐5.67 ** 1.65 ‐0.08 ** 0.01
Driver 2 indicator ‐10.29 26.66 ‐6.15 4.72 ‐0.02 0.03
Std Err






Constant ‐9.21 ** 0.26 ‐18.51 29.42 ‐0.40 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age ‐0.72 ** 0.15 0.01 0.99 ‐0.04 ** 0.01
Driver 1 age squared 0.19 * 0.11 ‐6.22 21.34 0.00 0.00
Driver 1 female 0.23 ** 0.11 ‐0.06 1.01 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 single ‐0.02 0.11 0.53 2.21 0.00 0.01
Driver 1 married ‐0.24 0.22 1.33 4.99 ‐0.01 0.01
Driver 1 credit score 0.37 ** 0.10 1.18 4.26 ‐0.04 ** 0.00
Driver 2 indicator ‐9.01 11.93 ‐3.53 12.45 0.00 0.02
σ 1.64 ** 0.05 3.98 ** 0.11 4.79 ** 0.16
Parameter mean
Parameter median
Note: Each variable z is normalized as (z‐mean(z))/stdev(z).
** Significant at 5 percent level.
  * Significant at 10 percent level.
0.0001132 0.0000 0.678
0.0000699 0.0000 0.676
Table A.23: Model 2 with Coverage‐Specific Choice Noise
Core Sample (4170 Households)
r Λα
Coef Coef Coef
Coef
0.0000749 0.0064 0.684
0.0000174 0.0000 0.668
Table A.22: Model 2 ‐ Home All Perils Only
Core Sample (4170 Households)
r Λα
Coef Coef Coef
A-13